

# **EU-27 WATCH**



**No. 9**  
*July 2010*

ISSN 1610-6458

[www.EU-27Watch.org](http://www.EU-27Watch.org)

# EU-27 Watch

## Contributing partners are

Austrian Institute of International Affairs, Vienna  
Bulgarian European Community Studies Association, Sofia  
Center for European Studies / Middle East Technical University, Ankara  
Centre d'études européennes de Sciences Po, Paris  
Centre d'étude de la vie politique, Université libre de Bruxelles  
Centre d'études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman, Luxembourg  
Centre of International Relations, Ljubljana  
Cyprus Institute for Mediterranean, European and International Studies, Nicosia  
Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen  
Elcano Royal Institute and UNED University, Madrid  
European Institute of Romania, Bucharest  
Federal Trust for Education and Research, London  
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki  
Foundation for European Studies - European Institute, Łódź  
Greek Centre of European Studies and Research, Athens

Institute of International Affairs and Centre for Small State Studies at the University of Iceland, Reykjavik  
Institute for International Relations, Zagreb  
Institute for World Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest  
Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon  
Institute of International and European Affairs, Dublin  
Institute of International Relations, Prague  
Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University  
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome  
Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Riga  
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta  
Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', The Hague  
Ohrid Institute for Economic Strategies and International Affairs, Skopje  
Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava  
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)  
University of Tartu

## On the project

Due to the new treaty provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the economic crises the enlarged EU of 27 member states is on the search for a new *modus operandi* while also continuing membership talks with candidate countries. The EU-27 Watch project is mapping out discourses on these and more issues in European policies all over Europe. Research institutes from all 27 member states and the four candidate countries give overviews on the discourses in their respective countries.

The reports focus on a **reporting period from December 2009 until May 2010**. This survey was conducted on the basis of a questionnaire that has been elaborated in March and April 2010. Most of the 31 reports were delivered in May 2010. This issue and all previous issues are available on the EU-27 Watch website: [www.EU-27Watch.org](http://www.EU-27Watch.org).

The EU-27 Watch No. 9 receives significant funding from the **Otto Wolff-Foundation, Cologne**, in the framework of the *"Dialog Europa der Otto Wolff-Stiftung"*, and financial support from the **European Commission**. The European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.



## Disclaimer

Institutes/authors are responsible for the content of their country reports. The publisher and editorial team cannot be held responsible for any errors, consequences arising from the use of information contained in the EU-27 Watch or its predecessors, or the content of external links on [www.EU-27watch.org](http://www.EU-27watch.org) or in the EU-27 Watch. The content of the EU-27 Watch is protected under German copyright law. The articles of the EU-27 Watch can be printed, copied, and stored for personal, scientific, and educational use for free. Articles of the EU-27 Watch may not be used for commercial purposes. Any other reprint in other contexts is not allowed without prior permission from the publisher. For permission or any other question concerning the use of the EU-27 Watch please contact: [info@EU-27watch.org](mailto:info@EU-27watch.org).

## Editorial Team

Publisher: Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp  
Executive Editor: Dr. Katrin Böttger  
Managing Editor: Julian Plottka  
Editorial Staff: Daniela Caterina, Gregory Kohler, Christoph Kornes  
Layout: Matthias Jäger

Contact: [info@EU-27watch.org](mailto:info@EU-27watch.org)  
[www.EU-27watch.org](http://www.EU-27watch.org)

 Institut für  
Europäische Politik  
Bundesallee 23  
D-10717 Berlin  
Tel.: +49/30/88.91.34-0  
Fax: +49/30/88.91.34-99  
E-mail: [info@iep-berlin.de](mailto:info@iep-berlin.de)  
Internet: [www.iep-berlin.de](http://www.iep-berlin.de)

---

**Germany****Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty: a question of leadership?****Gesa-Stefanie Brincker and Jochen Eisenburger\***

---

Having originally been one of the supporters of the creation of this new post of a President of the European Council in order to give the European Union (EU) a face and the work of the European Council more continuity and coherence, the German government in the end only supported a rather unimpressive politician to fulfil this important and demanding position. Thus, it became clear that the Merkel government did not want to install a personality ambitious to dominate EU policy making and able to attract a lot of media attention. It was rather a calm personality, possibly not being a “media rival” and political competitor to the heads of state and government in the European Council, who was finally preferred.

The German media explained the following advantages of Herman Van Rompuy’s calm character: as he has no desire for media attention, he could be able to moderate behind the scenes and thus more easily balance the different interests of EU member states.<sup>1</sup> Not least journalists praised the compromise between France and Germany that he was able to push forward in the context of the Greek crisis in February 2010.<sup>2</sup> One proof that Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy appreciated these moderating qualities could be the fact that they agreed to install a working group under Van Rompuy’s chair that is supposed to evaluate the lessons learned from the financial crisis by the end of 2010.

In general, German political actors attribute Van Rompuy the role of a facilitator of negotiations. They agree to his main function of chairing and preparing the European Council meetings and brokering member states’ interests in advance. Similar to other EU Heads of State, Merkel (Christian Democratic Union – CDU) seems to enjoy the growing influence of this new European institution, which is in part due to Van Rompuy’s promotion of the European Council negotiations. At the same time, the political weight of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers is, at least from an outside point of view, diminishing. With regards to German EU politics, the more active role of the European Council in the European crisis management and the exclusion of the foreign ministers from European Council meetings caused a power shift in the German foreign affairs system from the German Federal Foreign Ministry and its Minister Guido Westerwelle (Free Democratic Party – FDP), who is no longer an official member of the European Council according to the Lisbon Treaty, to the German Federal Chancellery and thus to Chancellor Merkel herself.

Whereas the German political actors did not concentrate on a debate about the new post of a European Council President nor on Van Rompuy himself, researchers strongly focused on the question of the unclear future institutional balance between the several EU heads that could lead rather to conflicts and discontinuity instead of the originally intended clarity via the installation of a stable EU president. Thus, conflicts on the question of competence could arise: Firstly, between the rotating EU presidency and the stable European Council President; secondly, between José Manuel Barroso, Catherine Ashton and Van Rompuy regarding the external representation of the Union; thirdly, between the European Commission President and the European Council President in the context of formulating new ideas on the underlying currents for the EU’s future development.<sup>3</sup> Any changes of the role of the rotating council presidency are linked to the respective EU member state and its political leaders who could either refrain from taking a leadership role and leave the moderation floor mainly to Van Rompuy, Ashton and Barroso or behave in concurrence to these EU personalities.

Due to her political affiliation, Catherine Ashton aroused less criticism than Van Rompuy from German opposition party members. Nevertheless, Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens, as well as the left-wing party DIE LINKE, questioned whether she would be able to fulfil the high variety of challenging tasks that lie ahead. DIE LINKE mainly demanded more involvement of the European Parliament in European foreign affairs.<sup>4</sup> In fact, incorporating the position of formerly two posts, High Representative and Foreign Affairs Commissioner, or even three (if one also considers her future chairing of the Foreign Affairs Council, formerly presided by the rotating EU presidency) proves to be difficult. Consequently, German Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Elmar Brok expressed his fears that Ashton could end up not sufficiently supporting European common interests, but instead getting stuck in Council matters and thus getting lost between various national interests and personalities.<sup>5</sup>

---

\* Institut für Europäische Politik.

Furthermore, not only could the EU's national foreign ministers get into a rivalry with Ashton, but Barroso could also become an awkward partner when it comes to the EU's external representation, as the German daily *Süddeutsche Zeitung* underlines.<sup>6</sup> Being institutionally placed between the intergovernmental Council and the supranational European Commission, Ashton might face ongoing tensions between the competences of these two bodies in European foreign affairs that she would have to balance. Initial proof for this were the discussions about the competences of the European External Action Service (EEAS) that would conflict with the Commission's formerly exclusive fields, such as development policy.

The EEAS has already been discussed among German actors in the context of the Lisbon Treaty deliberation. Then, in the context of Ashton's "Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service", the questions about the EEAS's institutional set-up and about the political control of this new diplomatic service became subject to debate again.

Westerwelle criticised Ashton's proposal for being unclear concerning the division of competences and saw a need for further negotiations. He emphasized the necessity of having an institution that would not only establish a double structure, but that should be able to speak with one voice for the European Union (EU).<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, members of the German government emphasised their will to reinforce the use of the German language on equal footing with English and French as official languages in the context of the EEAS's work and the recruitment criteria for the diplomatic personal of the EEAS.

In general, the German parties followed the position of their European complements. Accordingly, the parliament faction of the conservative CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union) argued similarly to Elmar Brok, German member and rapporteur of the European Parliament for the EEAS and spokesman of the European Peoples Party (EPP), that the EEAS should be closely linked to the communitarian European Commission instead of the Council in order to ensure a more effective control by the European Parliament. The SPD basically shared this view and emphasised that the European Parliament should exercise more budgetary control over the EEAS.<sup>8</sup> MEP Franziska Brantner and German Member of Parliament Manuel Sarrazin (both Greens) were disappointed by the proposal because it would create double structures in the field of development cooperation, thus hindering an efficient and coherent acting in external crisis management. A closer institutional link of the EEAS to the Council of Ministers or a more independent diplomatic service did not find any support in the debate, though. A more critical opinion on the EEAS proposal was held by DIE LINKE underlining that the Bundestag would run the danger of losing its competence and control of German military missions. Jürgen Wagner, working for Informationsstelle Militarisierung (IMI), shared this criticism and stated that Ashton's proposal would fail to establish mechanisms of parliamentary control. Moreover, his organisation holds the opinion that, by integrating all military structures into the EEAS, the institution could be dominated by security policy interests. Other decisive elements, such as development policy or the promotion of human rights, might thus become subordinated.<sup>9</sup> In general, the idea of integrating the development policy sector in the EEAS's structures aroused special attention in Germany and was criticised in the last months by several German non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks. For instance, VENRO (Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen), a German association that represents about 120 NGOs in the development cooperation sector, argued that European development policy would need an independent institutional structure that would be able to articulate its interests independently.<sup>10</sup>

The public consultation process that was opened by the European Commission regarding its proposal defining the rules and procedures for the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) was actively received by German political parties, the Parliament and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Some of the German Landtage, the regional parliaments, adopted resolutions on the ECI as well and forwarded them to the Commission.<sup>11</sup>

The majority of German political parties shared the same expectations for the ECI. It was regarded as being a new instrument for the participation of EU-citizens in European policy-making and an opportunity to reduce the distance between the Union and its citizens. Moreover, the ECI was expected to contribute to the promotion of transnational debates on European issues. Only DIE LINKE criticised, with reference to Article 11 (4) Treaty on European Union, that the planned ECI regulations would not aim at a direct participation of EU citizens in EU politics and thus no contribution to overcoming the EU's democratic deficit was undertaken. The governing FDP, as well as the opposition SPD and Greens, saw the need to facilitate some of the criteria planned for a successful ECI, especially concerning the minimum number of countries represented by the ECI and the quorum for

each member state. In addition, the Greens called for the right for initiators of an ECI to challenge decisions by the Commission, the right of public consultations, the introduction of data protection measures and the obligation for initiators of ECIs to reveal their financial sources. On the contrary, the party of Chancellor Merkel, the CDU, supported the Commission's proposal and regarded an intervention of the Bundestag as unnecessary.<sup>12</sup>

German NGOs were sceptical towards the Commission's proposal: For instance, the NGOs Mehr Demokratie e.V.,<sup>13</sup> the Young European Movement<sup>14</sup> and Greenpeace Deutschland criticised the formal criteria of putting forward an initiative as being too difficult to reach. The idea of using the identity card number or social security card number as a measure for verification of votes is rejected. In sum, the mentioned NGOs shared the concern that the ECI runs danger to become an empty shell that would be unable to fulfil the high expectations connected to it.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bilger, Oliver: EU-Ratpräsident, Schöngest mit Schlagkraft, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 21 November 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. e.g. Stabenow, Michael: EU-Ratspräsident Van Rompuy: Anlaufstelle für Merkel und Sarkozy, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 April 2010.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Kietz, Daniela/Von Ondarza, Nicolai: Willkommen in der Lissabonner Wirklichkeit, SWP Aktuell 29, March 2010, p. 2-3.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Lösing, Sabine: Tabula Rasa: Ashton nur ein leeres Blatt Papier?, press statement, 2 December 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Busse, Nicolaus: EU Außenbeauftragte, Sagen Sie mir die Richtung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 December 2009.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Winter, M.: Einsame Kämpferin in Brüssel, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 3 March 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Handelsblatt: Streit um EU-Außenpolitik eskaliert, 31 March 2010, available at: <http://www.handelsblatt.com> (last access: 15 July 2010).

<sup>8</sup> SPD AG Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union: Europas Außenpolitik demokratisch mitgestalten, press statement 867, 22 June 2010.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. IMI-Standpunkt 2010/008: Ein Militärisch-Auswärtiger Dienst für Europas imperiale Machtpolitik, 29 March 2010, available at: <http://www.imi-online.de/2002.php?id=2090> (last access: 15 July 2010).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. VENRO: Entwicklungspolitik muss eigenständig bleiben, 26 April 2010, available at: <http://www.venro.org> (last access: 15 July 2010).

<sup>11</sup> See inter alia the resolution of the Bavarian Landtag, available at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat\\_general/citizens\\_initiative/docs/bayern\\_landtag\\_de.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/citizens_initiative/docs/bayern_landtag_de.pdf) (last access: 15 July 2010); and the Resolution of Landtag of Saxony-Anhalts, available at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat\\_general/citizens\\_initiative/docs/lt\\_sachsen\\_anhalt\\_de.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/citizens_initiative/docs/lt_sachsen_anhalt_de.pdf) (last access: 15 July 2010).

<sup>12</sup> For the transcript of the debate on the European Commission's Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Europeans Citizens' Initiative in the German Bundestag on 20 May 2010 see Document number 17/43, available at: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17043.pdf>, as well as the speeches of Thomas Dörflinger, Karl Holmeier, Michael Roth, Dr. Stefan Ruppert, Dr. Dieter Dehm and Manuel Sarrazin.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Mehr Demokratie e.V.: Stellungnahme zum Vorschlag der EU-Kommission für eine Verordnung des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates über die Bürgerinitiative vom 31.3.2010 (Stand 7.5.2010), available at:

[http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat\\_general/citizens\\_initiative/docs/mehr\\_demokratie\\_de.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/citizens_initiative/docs/mehr_demokratie_de.pdf) (last access: 15 July 2010).

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Junge Europäische Bewegung: Stellungnahme der Jungen Europäischen Bewegung Berlin-Brandenburg e.V. zum Verordnungsvorschlag der Europäischen Kommission über die Europäische Bürgerinitiative, 5 April 2010, available at: [http://jeb-bb.de/fileadmin/files\\_jef-d-bb/2010/EBI/100405\\_Stellungnahme\\_der\\_JEB\\_zur\\_EBI-VO.pdf](http://jeb-bb.de/fileadmin/files_jef-d-bb/2010/EBI/100405_Stellungnahme_der_JEB_zur_EBI-VO.pdf) (last access: 15 July 2010).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Mehr Demokratie e.V.: NGOs fordern Nachbesserungen bei der Europäischen Bürgerinitiative (EBI), 11 May 2010, available at: [http://www.mehr-demokratie.de/752.html?&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=276&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=7274&cHash=08d16dcf7a40c6f8ca2462d38fcae10a](http://www.mehr-demokratie.de/752.html?&tx_ttnews[backPid]=276&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=7274&cHash=08d16dcf7a40c6f8ca2462d38fcae10a) (last access: 15 July 2010).

---

**Germany**
**Germany more realistic and less enthusiastic of further enlargements; Neighbourhood Policy projects assessed positively**

 Katrin Böttger and Daniela Caterina\*
 

---

Of the three current accession candidates Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey, only Croatia is expected to be part of the next enlargement round. Macedonia is not mentioned much in the public debate and Turkey is a special case of concern in Germany due to the Turkish minority living in the country. In addition, Iceland is expected to join soon. As for future enlargements, the general opinion in Germany is that it has to be done “by the book”, which means in a controlled and not turbo way. This resonates in the government’s coalition agreement of the new conservative/liberal government which backs an “enlargement policy with a sense of proportion”.<sup>1</sup>

Recently, less favourable voices are on the rise. In general, the German public views a membership of more than the current 27 member states critically. 66 percent of Germans (compared to 46 percent of Europeans in average) are against further enlargement of the EU.<sup>2</sup> For example, at his acceptance speech on the Sonning Prize, the German author Hans Magnus Enzensberger criticised the EU’s enlargement frenzy.<sup>3</sup> However, the former Commissioner Günter Verheugen assumes that the enlargement waves will continue and cannot be stopped since the process has a dynamic of its own.<sup>4</sup>

*Croatia – fighting corruption and privatisation seen as most urgent*

After talking with the Croatian Prime Minister Jandranka Kosor, German Chancellor Angela Merkel pointed out that a date for accession will not be set before all criteria are fulfilled. The most important aspects to be dealt with are the fight against corruption and privatisation regulation. Overall, Chancellor Merkel is more reluctant than the other heads of state and government in the EU: “After Bulgaria and Romania’s entry in 2007, landing the EU with unresolved corruption and organised crime problems, enlargement became deeply unpopular in Germany, and is considered a serious vote-loser in Ms Merkel’s own Christian Democrat Party [CDU].”<sup>5</sup>

The internal changes and especially the presidential elections in Croatia have been the subject of many newspaper articles and analyses by political foundations.<sup>6</sup> For the whole region of the Western Balkans, Croatia’s accession is seen as setting a good example, a view shared by German Members of European Parliaments (MEPs).<sup>7</sup>

*Iceland – a newcomer welcomed warmly*

In the case of Iceland, Germany’s parliament (Bundestag) was the first to pave the way for opening membership talks.<sup>8</sup> It thus made use of the new Lisbon Treaty’s accompanying law, according to which the government now has to ask the parliament’s consent in order to agree to accession talks.<sup>9</sup>

Following a motion by the governing coalition’s fractions, these latter gave their consent, while the Social Democrats (SPD) as well as the Greens abstained and the left-wing party DIE LINKE opposed the motion. Nevertheless, all five parties generally supported the beginning of membership negotiations<sup>10</sup> in motions of their own, which emphasised different aspects of Icelandic membership.<sup>11</sup> However, cautious voices could also be heard which appealed not to repeat earlier enlargements’ mistakes, when new members were taken in too early.<sup>12</sup> More specifically, these voices addressed the fisheries, unanimously identified as the most problematic field for membership, in which Iceland should not be given opt-outs though possibilities for transition. In addition, it was seen as problematic that the Icelandic population, with a total of 93 percent, overwhelmingly voted “No” against an international agreement dealing with the Icesave case.<sup>13</sup>

On the whole, however, much like in the context of Croatia, the stance is generally positive.<sup>14</sup> Some German politicians underlined the fact that accession should be prepared under the strict conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria; moreover, no dates should be named too early and neither packet deals should be made nor enlargement waves envisaged too hastily.<sup>15</sup> Initially, the Christian Social Union

---

 \* Institut für Europäische Politik.

(CSU) warned that it is not the EU's role to save bankrupt countries; however, it later supported Iceland's accession in the German parliament.<sup>16</sup>

Concerning the countries, which are not expected to become members in the next enlargement round, the accession process in the Western Balkan states is considered to be too slow and the membership negotiations with Turkey have slowed to a crawl due to various reservations from the EU member states, ranging from specificities concerning trade with Cyprus to the general question of membership.

#### *Western Balkans – cautious enlargement at a snail's pace*

Enlargement and stability in the Western Balkans region is in Germany's interest, an estimated 50 percent of deputies are said to be knowledgeable in the region.<sup>17</sup> However, in a discussion on a motion by the Social Democrats on the Western Balkan countries' European perspective, Marieluise Beck (Green Party) warned that there is a danger of the Western Balkan states being forgotten by the EU.<sup>18</sup> This motion stressed the need to continue pressing ahead with the political and economic stabilisation of the region. In addition, it asked to react quickly, but only if conditions are fulfilled.<sup>19</sup> The albeit slow progress shows the importance of a membership perspective for the stabilisation process in the Western Balkans. In this case as for future enlargements, the general opinion in the German political sphere is set both against short cuts on the fulfilment of the accession criteria and against an automated membership perspective.

#### *Turkish accession remains point of contention*

One of the countries not expected to become a member in the next enlargement round is Turkey, and discussions on the subject remain frequent and heated. In general, the government's coalition agreement sees the membership talks with Turkey as an open-ended process. Moreover, the question of Turkey's membership perspective is strongly combined with the process of integration of the three million strong Turkish minority into German society.

The German-Turkish interactions in the reporting period were intense due to a visit by Chancellor Merkel to Turkey in March 2010. This gained high visibility due to the word battle preceding the visit, where Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Merkel continued to distance themselves from the other's opinion on Turkish schools in Germany, Turkish EU membership and sanctions against Iran.<sup>20</sup> Already on the way to Ankara and Istanbul, the German delegation struck a different tone, stressing the fact that the personal relations between the two politicians were excellent.<sup>21</sup> In a speech at the German-Turkish Economic Forum, Angela Merkel called for pragmatism concerning the question of Turkey's full membership to the EU.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, she identified the Ankara Agreement as the largest barrier inhibiting the opening of negotiation chapters. Therefore, Turkey first has to clarify its situation with Cyprus.<sup>23</sup>

One statement by Angela Merkel has been repeated in German media many times, namely that she has now understood that the expression "privileged partnership" has a negative connotation in Turkey. This does not mean, however, that she is shying away from the concept,<sup>24</sup> which she understands as a special relationship – a better and more intensive one than with other third states. She also called for consideration on whether full membership should still be aspired to by Turkey or not.<sup>25</sup> However, despite the fact that her opinion on full membership differs from the Turkish one, she stressed the circumstance that "pacta sunt servanda" and that the negotiations should be continued.<sup>26</sup>

The German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle also spoke on the EU-Turkey relations, demanding the country's commitment to reforms.<sup>27</sup> Being from a party with a more positive stance towards Turkish EU-membership, he stressed the fact that Turkey has a right to fair negotiations and that the EU should stick to its contracts.<sup>28</sup> He also referred to the coalition agreement to point this out. Furthermore, he called for a new dynamic in the accession negotiations, which would have to start with settling the disagreements with Cyprus.<sup>29</sup> As for other German politicians, while Ruprecht Polenz (CDU) says that it would be better to have Turkey in the EU, but only if it fulfils the criteria,<sup>30</sup> the social democrat Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) stresses the fact that there is a promise to be kept as regards Turkey.<sup>31</sup>

#### *ENP and presidential elections in Ukraine*

In general, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its two regional projects, the Union for the Mediterranean and even more so the Eastern Partnership, are positively assessed in Germany. The

coalition agreement supports a further development of these policies, especially of the Eastern Partnership, based on common values.<sup>32</sup>

Due to the presidential elections in Ukraine, this country was a focal point concerning the ENP during the reporting period. In an article in the Financial Times Deutschland, Guido Westerwelle, together with the Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kohout, stressed the fact that the newly elected Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, wants to and should anchor Ukraine even more strongly within European norms and values.<sup>33</sup>

According to Cornelia Pieper, Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office, the German government has a considerable interest in a stronger political and economic rapprochement of Ukraine to the EU and would welcome a near conclusion of the negotiations on an association agreement.<sup>34</sup> However, although Ukraine is an important partner in the Eastern Partnership, a membership perspective is not on the agenda.

---

<sup>1</sup> Wettach, Silke: Erweiterung, Staaten pochen wieder an die Tür, WirtschaftsWoche, 17 December 2009, available at: <http://www.wiwo.de/politik-weltwirtschaft/erweiterung-staaten-pochen-wieder-an-die-tuer-416739/> (last access: 19 May 2010); Tepasse, Nicole: Bosnien "auf der Kippe", Das Parlament, 7 December 2009, available at: <http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2009/50/EuropaWelt/28050693.html> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>2</sup> European Commission: Eurobarometer 71 – National Report – Executive Summary Germany, Spring 2009, available at: [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71\\_de\\_en\\_exec.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb71/eb71_de_en_exec.pdf) (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Kaczmarek, Michael: Enzensberger: EU ist "grenzlos großwahnsinnig", EurActiv, 2 February 2010, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/erweiterung-und-partnerschaft/artikel/enzensberger-eu-ist-grenzenlos-grenwahnsinnig-002680> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>4</sup> EurActiv: Verheugen: Erweiterung hat "unaufhaltsame Dynamik", 26 January 2010, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/unternehmen-und-arbeit-000315/artikel/verheugen-erweiterung-hat-unaufhaltsame-dynamik-002650> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Pries, Knut: Germany declines to set date for Croatia's EU entry, EUobserver, 5 February 2010, available at: <http://waz.euobserver.com/?aid=29416> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>6</sup> Schwarz, Karl-Peter: Teilung Bosniens kommt nicht in Frage, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 3 February 2010; Schwarz, Karl-Peter: Josipović will Streitfragen mit Belgrad beilegen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 January 2010; Wessel, Reinhard: Von Sanader zu Kosor; von Mesić zu Josipović – Die Neuordnung des politischen Systems in Kroatien im Jahr 2009/2010, country report of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 18 January 2010, available at: [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_18988-544-1-30.pdf](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_18988-544-1-30.pdf) (last access: 19 May 2010); Schwarz, Karl-Peter: Konservative Stimmen für den Roten, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 January 2010; Wessels, Reinhard: Kroatien bekommt einen neuen Staatspräsidenten, country report of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 11 January 2010, available at: [http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/40/1/year-2010/dokument\\_id-18572/index.html](http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/40/1/year-2010/dokument_id-18572/index.html) (last access: 19 May 2010); Schwarz, Karl-Peter: Ein grundsolider Favorit und ein aggressiver Gegner, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 January 2010; Schwarz, Karl-Peter: Sanader kündigt politische Rückkehr an, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 January 2010; Schwarz, Karl-Peter: Stichwahl in Kroatien zwischen Josipović und Bandić, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 December 2009; Schwarz, Karl-Peter: Gegenkandidaten aus dem eigenen Lager, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 December 2009.

<sup>7</sup> EurActiv: Croatia's accession negotiations set to conclude this year, 11 February 2010, available at: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/croatias-accession-negotiations-set-conclude-year> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Blogactiv: Island und die neuen Rechte des Bundestages, 22 April 2010, available at: <http://nachbar.blogactiv.eu/2010/04/22/island-und-die-neuen-rechte-des-bundestages/> (last access: 19 May 2010); Pop, Valentina: German house in landmark vote on Iceland EU membership, EUobserver, 22 April 2010, available at: <http://euobserver.com/15/29913> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>9</sup> EurActiv: Premiere im Bundestag: Grünes Licht für neue Beitrittsverhandlungen, 22 April 2010, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/erweiterung-und-partnerschaft/artikel/premiere-bundestag-erstmal-ber-eu-beitrittskandidaten-abgestimmt-002992> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>10</sup> Antrag der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP, Drucksache 17/1190, 24 March 2010, available at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/011/1701190.pdf> (last access: 19 May 2010); Antrag der Abgeordneten Dietmar Nietan et. al. und der Fraktion der SPD, Drucksache 17/1163, 23 March 2010, available at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/011/1701163.pdf> (last access: 19 May 2010); Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Diether Dehm et. al. und der Fraktion DIE LINKE, Drucksache 17/1059, 16 March 2010, available at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/010/1701059.pdf> (last access: 19 May 2010); Antrag der Abgeordneten Manuel Sarrazin et. al. und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, Drucksache 17/271, 16 December 2009, available at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/002/1700271.pdf> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>11</sup> Sach, Annette: Am Rande des Vulkans, Das Parlament, 26 April 2010, available at: <http://www.das-parlament.de/2010/17/EuropaWelt/29450444.html> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>12</sup> EurActiv: Premiere im Bundestag: Grünes Licht für neue Beitrittsverhandlungen, 22 April 2010, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/erweiterung-und-partnerschaft/artikel/premiere-bundestag-erstmal-ber-eu-beitrittskandidaten-abgestimmt-002992> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>13</sup> Schymik, Carsten: Islands Volksabstimmung über Icesave, SWP-Aktuell 14, February 2010, available at: [http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get\\_document.php?asset\\_id=6797](http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=6797) (last access: 19 May 2010); Zeit online: 93 Prozent der Isländer sagen Nein zu Schuldentilgung, 7 March 2010, available at: <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2010-03/island-referendum-schulden> (last access: 10 June 2010).

<sup>14</sup> EurActiv: France, Germany ponder Iceland EU accession fallout, 10 December 2009, available at: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/france-germany-ponder-iceland-eu-accession-fallout/article-188216> (last access: 19 May 2010).

<sup>15</sup> EurActiv: Premiere im Bundestag: Grünes Licht für neue Beitrittsverhandlungen, 22 April 2010, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/erweiterung-und-partnerschaft/artikel/premiere-bundestag-erstmal-ber-eu-beitrittskandidaten-abgestimmt-002992> (last access: 19 May 2010); Pop, Valentina: German house in landmark vote on Iceland EU membership,

- 
- EUobserver, 22 April 2010, available at: <http://euobserver.com/15/29913> (last access: 19 May 2010); Deutscher Bundestag: Plenarprotokoll 17/37, 22 April 2010, available at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17037.pdf> (last access: 21 June 2010).
- <sup>16</sup> EurActiv: France, Germany ponder Iceland EU accession fallout, 10 December 2009, available at: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/france-germany-ponder-iceland-eu-accession-fallout/article-188216> (last access: 19 May 2010); Deutscher Bundestag: Islands EU Beitritt im Blick, available at: [http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2010/29324587\\_kw16\\_sp\\_eu\\_island/index.html](http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2010/29324587_kw16_sp_eu_island/index.html) (last access: 21 Juni 2010).
- <sup>17</sup> Antrag der Fraktion der SPD, Drucksache 17/106, 1 December 2009, available at: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/001/1700106.pdf> (last access: 19 May 2010); Nicole Tepassee: Bosnien "auf der Kippe", Das Parlament, 7 December 2009, available at: <http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2009/50/EuropaWelt/28050693.html> (last access: 21 June 2010).
- <sup>18</sup> Tepassee, Nicole: Bosnien "auf der Kippe", Das Parlament, 7 December 2009, available at: <http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2009/50/EuropaWelt/28050693.html> (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>19</sup> Antrag der Fraktion der SPD, Drucksache 17/106, 01 December 2009, available at: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/001/1700106.pdf> (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>20</sup> Braun, Stefan: Gemeinsam lächeln, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 March 2010, available at: <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/267/507426/text/> (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> Rede der Bundeskanzlerin beim Deutsch-Türkischen Wirtschaftsforum, Istanbul, 30 March 2010, available at: [http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Rede/2010/03/2010-03-30-merkel-istanbul-deutsch-t\\_C3\\_BCrkisches-wirtschaftsforum.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Rede/2010/03/2010-03-30-merkel-istanbul-deutsch-t_C3_BCrkisches-wirtschaftsforum.html) (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>23</sup> Regierung online: Deutschland und die Türkei: Partner in Europa, 30 March 2010, available at: <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2010/03/2010-03-29-ankara-erster-tag-tuerkei.html> (last access: 21 June 2010).
- <sup>24</sup> Pressekonferenz der Bundeskanzlerin mit Ministerpräsident Erdogan, Ankara, 29 March 2010, available at: [http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn\\_1516/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2010/03/2010-03-29-pk-merkel-erdogan.html](http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_1516/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2010/03/2010-03-29-pk-merkel-erdogan.html) (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup> Güsten, Susanne: Störfeuer aus Kreuth reicht bis nach Ankara, Tagesspiegel, 7 January 2010, available at: <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/international/stoerfeuer-aus-kreuth-reicht-bis-nach-ankara/1659932.html> (last access: 19 May 2010); EurActiv: Westerwelle fordert Reformen von der Türkei, 7 January 2010, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/erweiterung-und-partnerschaft/artikel/westerwelle-mahnt-trkei-zu-reformen-002573> (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>28</sup> "Deutschland in Europa – eine Standortbestimmung" – Rede von Bundesaußenminister Guido Westerwelle an der Universität Bonn, 27 April 2010, available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2010/100427-BM-D-in-Europa.html> (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>29</sup> Rede von Außenminister Guido Westerwelle anlässlich der Botschafterkonferenz des türkischen Außenministeriums in Ankara, 7 January 2010, available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2010/100107-BM-BoKo-Ankara.html> (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>30</sup> Bickerich, Sebastian: Es wäre besser, die Türkei in der EU zu haben, Tagesspiegel, 29 March 2010.
- <sup>31</sup> EurActiv: Steinmeier: Der Türkei sind wir im Wort, 29 January 2010, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/erweiterung-und-partnerschaft/artikel/steinmeier-der-trkei-sind-wir-im-wort-002665> (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>32</sup> CDU.de: Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. Der Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP, 17. Legislaturperiode, available at: <http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdfc/091026-koalitionsvertrag-cducsu-fdp.pdf> (last access: 21 June 2010).
- <sup>33</sup> Westerwelle, Guido /Kohout, Jan: Die Partner im Osten müssen ins Boot, Financial Times Deutschland, 4 March 2010, available at: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Presse/Interviews/2010/100304-BM-Kohout-FTD.html> (last access: 19 May 2010).
- <sup>34</sup> Deutscher Bundestag: Plenarprotokoll 17/21, 9 February 2010, available at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17021.pdf> (last access: 21 June 2010).

---

**Germany**
**Europe's paymaster is on a budget**

Julian Plottka\*

---

While the Eurozone is facing the most severe crisis since the founding of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the economic situation in Germany seems to be recovering faster than expected. The newest estimations of the expected Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth vary between 1.9 percent and 2.3 percent for 2010.<sup>1</sup> Experts expect the number of employees on short time work to decrease until the end of 2010 and the total unemployment to drop to the lowest level since 1991. Anyway, due to the costs of the economic stimulus programmes and decreased tax revenues, the German parliament, the Deutsche Bundestag, agreed to finance 80.2 billion Euros of the 2010 federal budget by revenue obtained by the borrowing of funds. This is the largest revenue obtained by the borrowing of funds in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>2</sup> To fight the steadily increasing national debt, "limits of borrowing" were introduced into article 115 of the German basic law. According to this article, the "revenue obtained by the borrowing of funds [may] not exceed 0.35 percent in relation to the nominal gross domestic product." To comply with article 115 of the basic law, which enters into force on 1 January 2011, the federal government agreed on an austerity programme for the next four years. Opposition parties and labour unions criticised the austerity programme as being too burdensome for people with low and middle incomes, while wealthier people hardly contributed.<sup>3</sup> The German debate on European economic policy and the Euro crisis has to be judged against this background.

*Government coalition did not stand up against populist debate*

In Germany the published opinion on the Greek financial package had a quite populist undertone. Walter Wüllenweber wrote in the magazine *Der Stern* a letter of complaint to Greece. He blamed the Greek people for spending German money. Furthermore, he underlined that the only reason to rescue Greece is that in a Greek bankruptcy German banks would lose 30 billion Euros.<sup>4</sup> Even some politicians from the governing Christian Democrats (CDU) voiced populist ideas: the Member of Parliament (MP) Josef Schlarmann proposed that Greece could sell its islands to pay its debts.<sup>5</sup> Causing tensions between the German and Greek government, these blindfold ideas were not the core problem. Neither the opposition parties nor the government clearly argued against this populism. Renate Künast, leader of the Green faction in German parliament, asks, where was Ms Merkel? Why did she not say: "Not this way!"<sup>6</sup> One interpretation was that the government coalition was afraid to lose the regional elections in North Rhine-Westphalia.<sup>7</sup>

But the votes in the German parliament, the Deutscher Bundestag, on the so called Währungsunion-Finanzstabilitätsgesetz<sup>8</sup> make obvious that none of the two large parties (CDU and Social Democrats – SPD) took a clear stance on the financial help for Greece: 391 MPs voted for the law, 72 MPs were against the law, while 139 abstained from the vote. From the government coalition of the CDU, the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which had initiated the law, five MPs voted against the law. From the opposition SPD four MPs voted for the law while the others abstained from the vote. The SPD faction decided to abstain, because the coalition government was not willing to vote for a resolution calling for the introduction of a financial transaction tax.<sup>9</sup> From the other two opposition parties, the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) voted for the financial package,<sup>10</sup> while the left-wing party Die Linke voted against it.<sup>11</sup> Four SPD MPs criticised their party indirectly: e.g., Eva Högel reasoned that she had to vote for the package agreed on, because there is no alternative to this solution and that it is necessary to send a signal of solidarity to Greece.<sup>12</sup>

Another type of criticism is the constitutional challenge to the European stabilisation mechanism currently hanging on at the federal constitutional court in Karlsruhe.<sup>13</sup> Most prominently Peter Gauweiler, CSU MP, who already filed a suit against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in Germany, challenges the mechanism as not being in line with the European primary law.<sup>14</sup> The federal constitutional court has not finally decided on the case, but refused to issue a temporary injunction on the German parliament's agreement to the mechanism.<sup>15</sup> What will be interesting during the proceedings is the question, whether the German federal constitutional court will follow its path, started by its decision on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, to empower itself to decide on European

---

\* Institut für Europäische Politik.

law or not. Already in May 2010 the German federal constitutional court refused to issue a temporary injunction on the first financial help granted to Greece. A group of professors, who had appealed to the German federal constitutional court in 1998 to stop the introduction of the common currency in 1999,<sup>16</sup> argued the financial package conflicts with the principle of the welfare state (article 20 basic law) and transforms the European Union into a federal state.<sup>17</sup>

### *Too late to help?*

The evaluation of the decision making process is made on two levels. On a more general and theoretical level the trade off between output and input legitimacy is discussed. On a more concrete level the direct implications for the Eurozone are evaluated. On the theoretical level it is argued that the bargaining in Brussels and the parliamentary decisions later on take too much time to react to international financial markets.

Faster decisions are needed to give clear signals to the markets.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, the time pressure on the German parliament was criticised: were the MPs able to deliberate and decide on the package for Greece and the European stabilisation mechanism or did they just do what the government told them?<sup>19</sup> Furthermore a debate on the unbalanced representation of consumers' interests and the interests of actors on the financial market started.<sup>20</sup> Some Members of the European Parliament (MEP), among them the German Green MEP Sven Giegold, started a "call for a finance watch". They try to create a consumers' rights organisation with expertise in the field of financial market regulation to counter balance the influence of the financial market actors on the decision-making processes.<sup>21</sup>

During the first half of 2010, the leadership of Chancellor Angela Merkel was criticised in general: during quarrels between the three parties of the government coalition, the debate on the austerity programme, and a nearly failed presidential election, many commentators missed Merkel's leadership.<sup>22</sup> That Merkel had to give up her position that the Union will not take any common measures to help Greece, but that everything had to be done on a bilateral basis during the negotiations on 9 May 2010, was regarded as a further sign of the decline of her leadership. Werner Mussler illustrated this by describing how Merkel left through the back door while French President Nicolas Sarkozy declared to journalists that the reached agreement contained 95 percent French ideas.<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, criticism has been voiced with regard to the preparations by the federal chancellery for the negotiations on the European level that all possible economic scenarios have not been taken into account.<sup>24</sup> During the electoral campaign to the regional elections, the SPD party leader, Sigmar Gabriel, accused Chancellor Merkel of lying to the voters. Gabriel presented her as an iron lady expecting reforms from the Greek government before negotiations on financial help start, while the Federal Minister for Finance Wolfgang Schäuble was already negotiating the financial package. Hans-Werner Sinn, head of the ifo institute Munich, agreed with the Chancellor's hesitant strategy to withhold financial help until Greece agreed on an internal austerity programme. According to him, the financial help is the only pressure to force the Greek government to save money.<sup>25</sup> Other economists criticised this strategy because it does not give a clear signal to the financial market that Europe is willing to support Greece.<sup>26</sup>

### *Lesson learned, but clear cut concepts still missing*

On 6 May 2010 the French President and the German Chancellor declared in a common letter: "The next thing we have to do is strengthen economic policy coordination in the Eurozone."<sup>27</sup> Thus the German government does not reject the idea of "European economic governance" in general anymore. But as the agreed wording "cooperation" indicates that this closer cooperation in the field of European economic policy does not refer to the policy of "dirigisme" often associated with the French idea of "European economic governance". The opposition, e.g., the Green party, is in favour of the idea of European economic governance and called on Chancellor Merkel to not block this deepening of European integration in March 2010.<sup>28</sup> The Social Democrats are in favour of it, too, but put a special emphasis on the complementation of the European economic governance by a coordination of social policies.<sup>29</sup> But neither the government nor the opposition parties have yet presented a clear-cut concept on what they understand to be increased cooperation in European economic policy. For the opposition parties it is much easier to present ideas, as they do not have to face the other heads of state and government during the negotiations on European policies. Thus, the SPD together with the Party of European Socialists (PES) proposed ideas ranging from the harmonisation of tax policy to introducing a minimum wage in Europe.<sup>30</sup>

The German federal government fully supports the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).<sup>31</sup> The Federal Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schäuble, plans to discuss the following nine points in the task force on economic governance: 1) tightening budgetary control; 2) improving budget discipline in the Eurozone; 3) introducing limits of borrowing on the national level (like article 115 of the German basic law); 4) temporarily freezing structural funds for states not complying with the rules of the SGP; 5) introducing obligatory midterm budget objectives for states with debts higher than 60 percent of GDP; 6) suspension of the voting rights of states violating the rules of the SGP; 7) discussing aberration in terms of economic development more openly; 8) monitoring of economic policy in the member states could be more transparent and include possible sanctions; 9) a permanent stabilisation mechanism to cope with crises, which includes a procedure for state insolvencies.<sup>32</sup>

Some of these ideas are heavily contested. For example the Social Democratic ministers from the German Länder were against the limits of borrowing in article 115 of the German basic law, as they saw the budget right of the regional parliaments violated,<sup>33</sup> and the labour unions and the party Die Linke saw the ability of politicians to act decreasing.<sup>34</sup> Thus it seems to be unlikely that national parliaments all over Europe will accept such a limitation of their budget right. A second issue heavily debated in Germany is the question of introducing a financial transaction tax. The Social Democrats strongly support the introduction of a financial transaction tax. Together with the Austrian Social Democrats, the SPD even planned to initiate a European Citizens' Initiative on that issue.<sup>35</sup> After the opposition parties and the government coalition could not agree on a wording to introduce the financial transaction tax in the so called (monetary union financial stabilisation law), as mentioned before, the coalition parties convinced Chancellor Merkel to support such a type of tax on the global level.<sup>36</sup>

#### *Europe 2020 Strategy: implementation will become crucial*

Compared to the debate on the crisis the Eurozone is facing at present, the Europe 2020 Strategy is hardly discussed in Germany. Chancellor Merkel received some attention by criticising the draft version of the Strategy. Her major points of criticism were the high number of targets, the plan to introduce country specific objectives, and the close link of the Strategy's economic targets to compliance with the requirements of the SGP. According to a letter Merkel wrote to José Manuel Barroso, these steps "would make fiscal surveillance 'unnecessarily political'", as the media reported.<sup>37</sup> But the overall assessment of the renewed strategy by the German federal government was positive. Non-governmental organisations, such as the Europa Union Deutschland, debated the major failures of the old Lisbon Strategy: the unsolved compliance problem and the too narrow focus on growth and international competitiveness.<sup>38</sup> The Umbrella Organisation of German Industry (BDI) and the Federation of German Employers' Associations (BDA) contrarily point out that growth and international competitiveness are not self-sufficient but are the basis for social progress; however, they agree that the Lisbon Strategy failed to achieve its main objectives and that the question of compliance to the targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy will be crucial for its success.<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Deutsche Presseagentur: Minister Brüderle: Wachstumsprognose angehoben, 24 July 2010, available at: [http://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/konjunktur-minister-bruederle-wachstumsprognose-angehoben\\_aid\\_533845.html](http://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/konjunktur-minister-bruederle-wachstumsprognose-angehoben_aid_533845.html) (last access: 28 July 2010).

<sup>2</sup> Deutscher Bundestag: Höchste Neuverschuldung, without date, available at: [http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2010/28966884\\_kw11\\_sp\\_hh\\_finanzen/index.html](http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2010/28966884_kw11_sp_hh_finanzen/index.html) (last access: 28 July 2010).

<sup>3</sup> David Crossland: Merkel's Austerity Program Is 'Faint-Hearted and Unbalanced', SpiegelOnline, 8 June 2010, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,699416,00.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).

<sup>4</sup> Walter Wüllenweber: Beschwerdebrief nach Griechenland: „Streng genommen seid Ihr pleite“, Der Stern 8/2010, available at: <http://www.stern.de/wirtschaft/geld/beschwerdebrief-nach-griechenland-streng-genommen-seid-ihr-pleite-1548605.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Bild.de: Verkauft doch eure Inseln, ihr Pleite-Griechen. ... und die Akropolis gleich mit!, 4 March 2010, available at: <http://www.bild.de/BILD/politik/wirtschaft/2010/03/04/pleite-griechen/regierung-athen-sparen-verkauft-inseln-pleite-akropolis.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).

<sup>6</sup> Deutscher Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht 41. Sitzung. Berlin, Freitag, den 7. Mai 2010, Plenarprotokoll 17/41, pp. 3998 (D)-3999 (A), available at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17041.pdf> (last access: 18 July 2010).

<sup>7</sup> The Christian Democrats became the largest faction in the regional parliament, but were not able to form a government.

<sup>8</sup> Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Übernahme von Gewährleistungen im Rahmen eines europäischen Stabilisierungsmechanismus, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/1685, available at: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/016/1701685.pdf> (last access: 28 July 2010); Beschlussempfehlung des Haushaltsausschusses (8. Ausschuss) zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP – Drucksache 17/1685 –, Bundestagsdrucksache 17/1740, available at: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/017/1701740.pdf> (last access: 28 July 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Entschließungsantrag der Fraktion der SPD zu der dritten Beratung des Gesetzentwurfs der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und FDP – Drucksachen 17/1544, 17/1561, 17/1562 –, Bundestagsdrucksache Drucksache 17/1639, available at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/016/1701639.pdf> (last access: 28 July 2010).

<sup>10</sup> Five Green MPs abstained from the vote, too.

- 
- <sup>11</sup> Deutscher Bundestag. Stenografischer Bericht 41. Sitzung. Berlin, Freitag, den 7. Mai 2010, Plenarprotokoll 17/41, pp. 4019 (B)-4022 (C), available at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/17/17041.pdf> (last access: 18 July 2010).
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 4105 (A)-4105(C).
- <sup>13</sup> SpiegelOnline: Is the Rescue Package Constitutional? German High Court Considers Euro Bailout, 8 June 2010, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,699471,00.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>14</sup> Peter Gauweiler: Presseerklärung, without date, available at: [http://www.peter-gauweiler.de/pdf/PM\\_EURO-Stabilitaetsgesetz.pdf](http://www.peter-gauweiler.de/pdf/PM_EURO-Stabilitaetsgesetz.pdf) (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>15</sup> Daryl Lindsey: German Judges Reject Request to Block Aid. High Court Refuses to Issue Injunction on Euro Bailout, 10 June 2010, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,699986,00.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>16</sup> Julian Plottka: The debate calmed down, in: Institut für Europäische Politik (ed.): EU-27 Watch, No. 7, September 2008, Berlin 2008, p. 223-229, available at: <http://www.EU-27Watch.org/?q=node/396> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>17</sup> Reinhard Müller: Karlsruhe weist Eilantrag ab, faz.net, without date, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/Rub3ADB8A210E754E748F42960CC7349BDF/Doc-E13A0CF201AEC486FAFF87E501B87A5FB-ATpl-Ecommon~Scontent.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>18</sup> Paul J.J. Welfens: Von der Griechenlandkrise zum Zerfall der Eurozone?, in: integration 3/2010, pp. 264-273.
- <sup>19</sup> Christoph Seils: Wie sich der Bundestag selbst entmachtet, Tagesspiegel, 3 May 2010, available at: <http://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/wie-sich-der-bundestag-selbst-entmachtet/1813170.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>20</sup> Katja Pink/Thilo Bode: Die Finanzkrise als Demokratiekrise. Der Staat als Dienstleister des Finanzkapitals, in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 6/2010, Seite 45-55.
- <sup>21</sup> Call for a finance watch, available at: <http://www.finance-watch.org/> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>22</sup> Christoph Schwennicke: The Limits of Merkel's Leadership, Spiegel Online, 1 July 2010, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,704069,00.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>23</sup> Werner Mussler: Das Endspiel um den Euro, 9 May 2010, faz.net, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/Rub3ADB8A210E754E748F42960CC7349BDF/Doc-E3DC798FEFC444D6F9E552AC27AC09CF5-ATpl-Ecommon~Sspezial.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>24</sup> Paul J.J. Welfens: Von der Griechenlandkrise zum Zerfall der Eurozone?, in: integration 3/2010, pp. 264-273, here p. 267.
- <sup>25</sup> Financial Times Deutschland: Union und SPD prügeln sich wegen Hilfe für Athen, 28 April 2010, available at: <http://www.ftd.de/politik/vor-nrw-wahl-union-und-spd-pruegeln-sich-wegen-hilfe-fuer-athen/50106870.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>26</sup> Paul J.J. Welfens: Von der Griechenlandkrise zum Zerfall der Eurozone?, in: integration 3/2010, pp. 264-273.
- <sup>27</sup> Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung: Gemeinsamer Brief von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy an die Präsidenten des Europäischen Rates und der Europäischen Kommission, 6 May 2010, available at: <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2010/05/2010-05-06-brief-merkel-sarkozy.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>28</sup> Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Bundestagsfraktion: Eurokrise durch koordinierte Wirtschaftspolitik lösen, press release, 19 March 2010, available at: [http://gruene-bundestag.de/cms/presse/dok/332/332991.eurokrise\\_durch\\_koordinierte\\_wirtschafts.html](http://gruene-bundestag.de/cms/presse/dok/332/332991.eurokrise_durch_koordinierte_wirtschafts.html) (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>29</sup> Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands: SPD und PS fordern stärkere wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Koordinierung in der Europäischen Union, presse release, 16 June 2010, available at: <http://www.spd.de/de/aktuell/pressemitteilungen/2010/06/SPD-und-PS-fordern-staerkere-wirtschafts--und-sozialpolitische-Koordinierung-in-der-Europaeischen-Union.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>31</sup> Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung: Gemeinsamer Brief von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel und dem französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy an die Präsidenten des Europäischen Rates und der Europäischen Kommission, 6 May 2010, available at: <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2010/05/2010-05-06-brief-merkel-sarkozy.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>32</sup> Finanzministerium: Neue europäische Task Force. Eckpunkte der Bundesregierung zur Stärkung der Eurozone, 21 May 2010, available at: [http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/lang\\_DE/nn\\_1270/DE/Wirtschaft\\_und\\_Verwaltung/Europa/Der\\_Euro/20100520-Task-Force.html](http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/lang_DE/nn_1270/DE/Wirtschaft_und_Verwaltung/Europa/Der_Euro/20100520-Task-Force.html) (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>33</sup> Tageszeitung: Ralf Stegner gegen Schuldenbremse. „Parlamente werden entmachtet“, 27 March 2009, available at: <http://www.taz.de/1/politik/deutschland/artikel/1/parlamente-werden-entmachtet/> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>34</sup> Uli Schnippels: Uli Schnippels zur so genannten „Schuldenbremse“: „Wir brauchen Investitionen in die Zukunft statt finanzielle Demontage.“, presse release, 5 May 2010, available at: <http://www.linksfraktion-sh.de/nc/presse/detail/artikel/die-linke-fordert-waas-zur-aussage-im-untersuchungsausschuss-auf-waas-muss-farbe-bekennen-1/> (last access 28 July 2010).
- <sup>35</sup> Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands: Spekulationssteuer: SPD und SPÖ für Europäische Bürgerinitiative, presse release, 18 May 2010, available at: <http://www.spd.de/de/aktuell/nachrichten/2010/05/Spekulationssteuer-SPD-und-SPÖe-fuer-Europaeische-Buergerinitiative.html> (last access: 28 May 2010).
- <sup>36</sup> Bundeskanzleramt: Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zu den Euro-Stabilisierungsmaßnahmen, 19 May 2010, available at: <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Regierungserklaerung/2010/2010-05-19-merkel-erklaerung-eu-stabilisierungsmassnahmen.html> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>37</sup> Euractive: Merkel criticises 'Europe 2020' strategy, 2 March 2010, available at: <http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/merkel-criticises-europe-2020-strategy-news-299825> (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>38</sup> Eva Högl: Forderungen an „Europa 2020“ – Ein Überblick, in: Europa 2020 - eine kritische Bewertung der neuen EU-Strategie, EUD-konkret 3/2010, pp. 5-7, available at: [http://www.europa-union.de/fileadmin/files\\_eud/PDF-Dateien\\_EUD/EUD\\_konkret/EUD-konkret\\_3.2010\\_Europa\\_2020.pdf](http://www.europa-union.de/fileadmin/files_eud/PDF-Dateien_EUD/EUD_konkret/EUD-konkret_3.2010_Europa_2020.pdf) (last access: 28 July 2010).
- <sup>39</sup> Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie/Bundesverband der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände: BDI/BDA-Stellungnahme zur öffentlichen Konsultation der Europäischen Kommission zur „EU 2020“-Strategie, 12 January 2010, available at: [http://www.bdi.eu/images\\_content/EuropaUndBruessel/BDA\\_BDI\\_Stellungnahme\\_EU\\_2020\\_Konsultation.pdf](http://www.bdi.eu/images_content/EuropaUndBruessel/BDA_BDI_Stellungnahme_EU_2020_Konsultation.pdf) (last access: 28 July 2010).

---

## Germany

### Scapegoat European Union?

Severin Fischer, Meike Löhr and Julian Schwartzkopff\*

---

In Germany, the outcome of the Copenhagen conference led to a variety of different interpretations. Chancellor Angela Merkel and the German government described the result with “mixed feelings”,<sup>1</sup> while environmental associations and opposition politicians called it a “disaster”<sup>2</sup> with a “disillusioning and insufficient result”.<sup>3</sup> Europe gave up its leading role on climate protection without even fighting for it, Reinhard Bütikofer (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) argued,<sup>4</sup> whereas the Social Democrats (SPD) accused China and the United States of not being cooperative enough.<sup>5</sup> Hubert Weiger, head of BUND, one of Germany’s most influential environmental NGOs, clearly expressed his disappointment about the EU being responsible for Copenhagen’s failure. The EU should have been an example for others, but stranded.<sup>6</sup> Germanwatch, another environmental NGO, argued that the “negotiating poker failed due to the misguided strategy pursued by central actors”.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, the EU did not take over a leadership role.

Before the beginning of the Copenhagen conference, the media criticised the EU for not being able to put a concrete offer on the table on how to finance mitigation and adaptation measures in developing countries.<sup>8</sup> During the conference, the EU was blamed for the absence of a common European position in general.<sup>9</sup> After the summit, the EU was accused for having negotiated clumsily.<sup>10</sup> This also corresponds to the German call for improvements in the EU’s strategy and policy. On the one hand, the EU has to avoid misjudgements of global interests and true intentions in the future, especially regarding China and the United States, in order to bring its influence to bear.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, changes have to be made on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reductions, as the EU failed to set concrete medium- and long-term targets, as environment Minister Norbert Röttgen, Christian Democratic Union (CDU), put it.<sup>12</sup> He claims that the EU now has to take further steps and propose an unconditional 30 percent CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction by 2020 instead of sticking to its hitherto decided 20 percent reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.<sup>13</sup> Germany’s national target, however, goes even further, aiming at a 40 percent reduction by 2020<sup>14</sup> in order to benefit from early investments in low-carbon technologies.<sup>15</sup> This 40 percent target is generally backed by the government, although some ministers such as Rainer Brüderle,<sup>16</sup> Free Democratic Party (FDP), fear negative impacts for the economy.<sup>17</sup> The Social Democrats (SPD) also support the target, while even aiming towards a 80-95 percent CO<sub>2</sub> reduction in the long-term.<sup>18</sup> The Left Party (DIE LINKE) aspires to a reduction of at least 50 percent by 2020.<sup>19</sup> At the same time, the Federation of German Industry (BDI) warns about setting a 40 percent target.<sup>20</sup> BDI-President Hans-Peter Keitl argues that it would negatively affect the competitiveness of German companies, cost jobs and would not improve global climate protection in general.<sup>21</sup> In order to tackle the problem of carbon leakage and accelerate low-carbon investments outside of Europe, France and Belgium started a discussion about the introduction of a carbon border tax. Environment Minister Norbert Röttgen describes trade restrictions as an inappropriate instrument for achieving environmental aims<sup>22</sup> and Matthias Machnig (SPD), economy minister of Thuringia, also disagrees with the effectiveness of this proposal, calling it “eco-imperialism”.<sup>23</sup> In Germany, most politicians prefer other instruments to create a level playing field with international competitors.

There is a clear preference for a binding agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on the part of the German government.<sup>24</sup> Environment Minister Norbert Röttgen (CDU) is still optimistic and sees the climate conferences to be held this year in Bonn and Cancún as essential steps towards such an agreement.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, the government admits to having misjudged the real distribution of power in Copenhagen and plans to forge new alliances.<sup>26</sup> Developing countries and emerging economies in particular should thus be engaged more actively by the EU in order to contest China’s role as self-proclaimed leader of the developing world.<sup>27</sup>

In order to rectify these mistakes and give new impetus to the UN negotiations, Germany hosted the Petersberg Climate Dialogue together with the Mexican government from 2-4 May 2010 in Bonn, Germany. This informal conference of the 43 countries representing the major negotiating blocks during COP15 was set up to reinvigorate international climate policy and to rebuild trust among the negotiating parties.<sup>28</sup> The parliamentary opposition nevertheless claimed this informal summit to be a failure. According to the Social Democratic<sup>29</sup> and Green<sup>30</sup> parliamentary groups, the conference has

---

\* Institut für Europäische Politik.

not produced any concrete results. On top of that, they argue that the governing coalition is cutting back on climate protection at home and has accordingly lost credibility on the international stage. Civil society groups like Germanwatch, Oxfam and Greenpeace largely agree that the government's climate policy undermines the international negotiations.<sup>31</sup> At the same time, even the critics concede that the informal process itself has the potential to bring the UNFCCC negotiations forward.<sup>32</sup>

While the government stresses the need to keep negotiating within the UNFCCC, some media commentators criticise the UN process as "inefficient", "time-consuming" and prone to instrumentalisation for "anti-western propaganda".<sup>33</sup> They argue that climate negotiations should instead be conducted in the G20 or some other small forum.<sup>34</sup>

The German government affirms its willingness to support developing countries in their fight against climate change. Immediately before the Copenhagen conference, Germany offered to provide 420 million Euros per year from 2010 to 2012.<sup>35</sup> This figure stands as the German contribution to the overall EU commitment to provide 7.2 billion US-Dollars over the same period. Originally, the German government had refused to provide clear figures for climate finance before Copenhagen. Officials feared that this would weaken Germany's capacity to extract concessions from third countries.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, the EU as a whole was not able to enter the Copenhagen conference with a concrete offer on financing, as requested by the Swedish Presidency.<sup>37</sup>

The German financial commitments are heavily criticised by the opposition and civil society groups. According to the current preliminary national budget, only 70 million of the climate-related funds for 2010 are new and additional.<sup>38</sup> The bulk of the money will be taken from existing budgets, primarily from development assistance funds. The Social Democratic Party,<sup>39</sup> the Green party<sup>40</sup> and NGOs like Germanwatch<sup>41</sup> and Oxfam<sup>42</sup> all agree in the assessment that this diminishes German credibility abroad and sets an alarming precedent for other industrialised countries.

The Federation of German Industry, on the other hand, argues that Germany, as a country with high emissions reduction targets, should not be expected to provide a disproportionately high amount of assistance to developing countries.<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> EurActiv.de: Schwacher Kompromiss in Kopenhagen, 19 December 2009, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/energie-klima-und-umwelt/artikel/schwacher-kompromiss-in-kopenhagen-002516> (last access: 26 April 2010).

<sup>2</sup> EurActiv.de: Katerstimmung nach Kopenhagen, 20 December 2009, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/energie-klima-und-umwelt/artikel/katerstimmung-nach-kopenhagen-002517> (last access: 26 April 2010). See also: Pinzler, Petra: Endlich stark sein, Die Zeit, 11 February 2010.

<sup>3</sup> dradio.de: Unterschiedliche Reaktionen auf Klimakonferenz in Kopenhagen, 19 December 2009, available at: <http://www.dradio.de/nachrichten/200912190300/2> (last access: 17 May 2010).

<sup>4</sup> Bütikofer, Reinhard: Kopenhagen: Endstation für Europas "Vorreiterrolle" im Klimaschutz?, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 21 April 2010, available at: <http://www.boell.de/oekologie/klima/klima-energie-reinhard-buetikofer-kopenhagen-europa-klima-9031.html> (last access: 18 May 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Miersch, Matthias/Schwabe, Frank: Klimakonferenz in Kopenhagen. Der Klimagipfel in Kopenhagen ist gescheitert, SPD Fraktion, 21 December 2009, available at: [http://www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs\\_dok/0\\_50013\\_00.html](http://www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs_dok/0_50013_00.html) (last access: 18 May 2010).

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Fuehr, Herbert: EU hat beim Klima ihre Chance vertan, Nürnberger Nachrichten, 21 December 2009, available at: <http://www.nn-online.de/artikel.asp?art=1144028&kat=3> (last access: 26 April 2010).

<sup>7</sup> Germanwatch: Climate summit in Copenhagen misses its target, 19 December 2009, available at: <http://www.germanwatch.org/presse/2009-12-19e.htm> (last access: 26 May 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Cf. EurActiv.de: EU verhandelt ohne konkretes Angebot in Kopenhagen, 30 October 2009, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/zukunft-und-reformen/artikel/eu-verhandelt-ohne-konkretes-angebot-in-kopenhagen-002312> (last access: 28 April 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Boltzen, Stefanie/Schiltz, Christoph B.: Klima-Gipfel in Kopenhagen wartet auf Europa, Welt Online, 11 December 2009, available at: <http://www.welt.de/die-welt/politik/article5494941/Klima-Gipfel-in-Kopenhagen-wartet-auf-Europa.html> (last access: 27 April 2010).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung: Krise statt Krönung, 20 December 2009, available at: <http://www.presseportal.de/pm/58964/1533648/neue-osnabruecker-zeitung> (last access: 27 April 2010).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Hönighaus, Reinhard: Die Lehren für Europa aus dem Klimagipfel, Financial Times Deutschland, 22 December 2009, available at: <http://www.ftd.de/politik/international/weltordnung-die-lehren-fuer-europa-aus-dem-klimagipfel/50053600.html> (last access: 27 April 2010).

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Röttgen, Norbert: Den Klimawandel gestalten, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 April 2010, available at: [http://www.bmu.de/presse/artikel\\_und\\_interviews/doc/45954.php](http://www.bmu.de/presse/artikel_und_interviews/doc/45954.php) (last access: 17 May 2010).

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Die Klimapolitik der Bundesregierung, official website of the German government, available at: <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/un-klimakonferenz/DE/KlimapolitikDerBundesregierung/klimapolitik-der-bundesregierung.html> (last access: 6 May 2010).

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Stabenow, Michael: EU will "Koalition der Gleichgesinnten", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 December 2009, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/RubC5406E1142284FB6BB79CE581A20766E/Doc--E3A0812B9C5624A0AA795666CDF872DC1~ATpl-Ecommon~Scontent.html> (last access: 28 April 2010).

- <sup>16</sup> Cf. Kauch: CO2-Reduktion durch Auslandsprojekte muss zusätzlich sein – Höhn: Da wird sehr viel getrickst, Pressemappe, Phoenix, 3 December 2009, available at: <http://www.presseportal.de/pm/6511/1523695/phoenix?search=fernsehen///> (last access: 17 May 2010).
- <sup>17</sup> Cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung: Brüderle bremst beim Klimaschutz, 26 May 2010.
- <sup>18</sup> Cf. SPD: Die Konferenz in Kopenhagen, available at: <http://www.spd.de/de/politik/Weltklimakonferenz/Klimakonferenz.html> (last access: 17 May 2010).
- <sup>19</sup> Cf. CO2-Handel.de: Linke wollen Klimaschutzziele gesetzlich festschreiben, 5 May 2010, available at: [http://www.co2-handel.de/article186\\_14218.html](http://www.co2-handel.de/article186_14218.html) (last access: 25 May 2010).
- <sup>20</sup> Cf. Bonse, Eric: Streit über Strafzölle für Klimasünder, Handelsblatt, 23 December 2009, available at: <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/europaeische-union-streit-ueber-strafoelle-fuer-klimasuender;2503847> (last access: 28 April 2010).
- <sup>21</sup> Cf. Fichtner, Nikolai: Röttgen legt sich mit Industrie an, Financial Times Deutschland, 27 December 2009, available at: <http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/klimaziel-40-prozent-roettgen-legt-sich-mit-industrie-an/50054568.html> (last access 29 April 2010).
- <sup>22</sup> Cf. Stabenow, Michael: EU will "Koalition der Gleichgesinnten", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 December 2009, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/RubC5406E1142284FB6BB79CE581A20766E/Doc-E3A0812B9C5624A0AA795666CDF872DC1~ATpl-ECommon-Scontent.html> (last access: 28 April 2010).
- <sup>23</sup> Cf. Liebert, Nicola: CO2-Zölle sollen das Klima retten, taz, 17 January 2010, available at: <http://www.taz.de/1/zukunft/umwelt/artikel/1/co2-zoelle-sollen-das-klima-retten/> (last access: 28 April 2010).
- <sup>24</sup> Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety: Röttgen: "Wichtiger Schritt für die internationalen Klimaverhandlungen", press release No. 014/10, 2 February 2010, available at: [http://www.bmu.de/pressemitteilungen/aktuelle\\_pressemitteilungen/pm/45594.php](http://www.bmu.de/pressemitteilungen/aktuelle_pressemitteilungen/pm/45594.php) (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>25</sup> Handelsblatt: Streit über Strafzölle für Klimasünder, 23 December 2009, available at: <http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/europaeische-union-streit-ueber-strafoelle-fuer-klimasuender;2503847> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>26</sup> EurActiv.de: Katerstimmung nach Kopenhagen, 20 December 2009, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/energie-klima-und-umwelt/artikel/katerstimmung-nach-kopenhagen-002517> (last access: 14 May 2010). See also EurActiv.de: Schwacher Kompromiss in Kopenhagen, 19 December 2009, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/energie-klima-und-umwelt/artikel/schwacher-kompromiss-in-kopenhagen-002516> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>27</sup> Röttgen, Nibert: Den Klimawandel gestalten, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 April 2010, available at: [http://www.bmu.de/presse/artikel\\_und\\_interviews/doc/45954.php](http://www.bmu.de/presse/artikel_und_interviews/doc/45954.php) (last access: 14 May 2010). See also Norbert Röttgen: Es geht um die Zukunftsmärkte, interviewed by Holger Möhle, Generalanzeiger Bonn, 5 February 2010, available at: <http://www.general-anzeiger-bonn.de/index.php?k=news&itemid=10028&detailid=69555&bid=800076> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>28</sup> Röttgen, Nibert: Den Klimawandel gestalten, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 April 2010, available at: [http://www.bmu.de/presse/artikel\\_und\\_interviews/doc/45954.php](http://www.bmu.de/presse/artikel_und_interviews/doc/45954.php) (last access: 14 May 2010). See also: Wyssuwa, Matthias: Subglobale Allianzen der Willigen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/Rub8ABC7442D5A84B929018132D629E21A7/Doc-EDA0686B892AA4C65866D49120F777EE5~ATpl-ECommon-Scontent.html> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>29</sup> SPD parliamentary group: Glaubwürdige Klimapolitik sieht anders aus, press release, 6 May 2010, available at: [http://www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs\\_dok/0\\_52033\\_00.html](http://www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs_dok/0_52033_00.html) (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>30</sup> Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, parliamentary group: Petersberger Dialog: Vertrauen schaffen braucht mehr als schöne Bilder, press release, 4 May 2010, available at: [http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/presse/dok/338/338618.petersberger\\_dialog\\_vertrauen\\_schaffen\\_b.html](http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/presse/dok/338/338618.petersberger_dialog_vertrauen_schaffen_b.html) (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>31</sup> Presseanzeiger: Germanwatch, Oxfam, WWF und Greenpeace kommentieren Petersberger Klimadialog, 2 May 2010, available at: <http://www.presseanzeiger.de/meldungen/politik/339707.php> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>32</sup> SPD parliamentary group: Glaubwürdige Klimapolitik sieht anders aus, press release, 6 May 2010, available at: [http://www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs\\_dok/0\\_52033\\_00.html](http://www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs_dok/0_52033_00.html) (last access: 14 May 2010). See also Presseanzeiger: Germanwatch, Oxfam, WWF und Greenpeace kommentieren Petersberger Klimadialog, 2 May 2010, available at: <http://www.presseanzeiger.de/meldungen/politik/339707.php> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>33</sup> Frankenberger, Klaus-Dieter: Neue machtpolitische Realitäten, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 January 2010, available at: [www.faz.net/s/Rub7FC5BF30C45B402F96E964EF8CE790E1/Doc-EE8241915F6A24F9A991281AB155E48D2~ATpl-ECommon-Scontent.html](http://www.faz.net/s/Rub7FC5BF30C45B402F96E964EF8CE790E1/Doc-EE8241915F6A24F9A991281AB155E48D2~ATpl-ECommon-Scontent.html) (last access: 14 May 2010). See also Hönighaus, Reinhard: Die Lehren für Europa aus dem Klimagipfel, Financial Times Deutschland, 22 December 2009, available at: <http://www.ftd.de/politik/international/weltordnung-die-lehren-fuer-europa-aus-dem-klimagipfel/50053600.html> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>34</sup> Minkmar, Nils: Erspart uns doch endlich den Kitsch, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 December 2009, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/RubCF3AEB154CE64960822FA5429A182360/Doc-EB4B2FC8630564F74BB876E94905AAF89~ATpl-ECommon-Scontent.html> (last access 14 May 2010). See also Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung: Kommentar zum Klimagipfel, 20 December 2009, available at: [http://www.presseportal.de/pm/58964/1533648/neue\\_osnabruecker\\_zeitung](http://www.presseportal.de/pm/58964/1533648/neue_osnabruecker_zeitung) (last access 14 May 2010).
- <sup>35</sup> Spiegel Online: Milliarden-Versprechen: EU bessert Klimahilfe für Entwicklungsländer nach, 11 December 2009, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/natur/0,1518,666573,00.html> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>36</sup> Bolzen, Stefanie/Christoph B. Schiltz: Klima-Gipfel in Kopenhagen wartet auf Europa, available at: <http://www.welt.de/die-welt/politik/article5494941/Klima-Gipfel-in-Kopenhagen-wartet-auf-Europa.html> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>37</sup> EurActiv.de: EU verhandelt ohne konkretes Angebot in Kopenhagen, 30 October 2009, available at: <http://www.euractiv.de/zukunft-und-reformen/artikel/eu-verhandelt-ohne-konkretes-angebot-in-kopenhagen-002312> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>38</sup> Seidler, Christoph: Gekürzte Finanzhilfen: Regierung knausert bei Klimaschutz-Zahlungen an arme Länder, Spiegel Online, 5 March 2010, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/natur/0,1518,681989,00.html> (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>39</sup> SPD parliamentary group: Klima-Zusagen aus Kopenhagen werden nicht eingehalten, press release, 5 March 2010, available at: [http://www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs\\_dok/0\\_51212\\_00.html](http://www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs_dok/0_51212_00.html) (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>40</sup> Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, parliamentary group: Schwarz-Gelb bricht Kopenhagen-Zusage, press release, 5 March 2010, available at: [http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/presse/dok/330/330538.schwarzgelb\\_bricht\\_kopenhagensusage.html](http://www.gruene-bundestag.de/cms/presse/dok/330/330538.schwarzgelb_bricht_kopenhagensusage.html) (last access: 14 May 2010).
- <sup>41</sup> Germanwatch: Koalitionsfraktionen verwässern Klimaversprechen der Bundesregierung, press release, 5 March 2010.

---

<sup>42</sup> Oxfam: UN-Klimaabkommen: Kommentar zum Haushaltsausschuss des deutschen Bundestags, press release, 4 March 2010, available at: <http://www.oxfam.de/presse/100304-un-klimaabkommen-kommentar-zum-haushaltsausschuss-des-deutschen-bundestags> (last access: 14 May 2010).

<sup>43</sup> Federation of German Industry: Klimaschutz nach Kopenhagen – mit Investitionen und Innovationen auf dem Weg in eine Low Carbon Economy, position paper, available at: [http://www.bdi-online.de/BDIONLINE\\_INEAASP/iFILE.dll/X323FFA10CD33430B9815F18FBAF7AEDE/2F252102116711D5A9C0009027D62C80/PDF/Positionspapier\\_Klimaschutz\\_nach\\_Kopenhagen\\_20100302.PDF](http://www.bdi-online.de/BDIONLINE_INEAASP/iFILE.dll/X323FFA10CD33430B9815F18FBAF7AEDE/2F252102116711D5A9C0009027D62C80/PDF/Positionspapier_Klimaschutz_nach_Kopenhagen_20100302.PDF) (last access: 14 May 2010).

---

**Germany****The mission in Afghanistan and the recent federal and regional elections**

Christoph Kornes\*

Since the German parliament has sent soldiers to Afghanistan, there has been a controversial debate in Germany about the meaning and purpose of the mission of the Bundeswehr (German armed forces). The Kunduz Province in northern Afghanistan, which was regarded as relatively safe, has developed into a dangerous area for German soldiers. Since 2002 a total of 43 soldiers of the Bundeswehr have died.<sup>1</sup> In April 2010 seven German soldiers were killed whereby the operation is becoming increasingly unpopular in the German population. A poll conducted by ARD television in April showed that 70 percent of the respondents demand a withdrawal from Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> The Bundestag, however, agreed on a new Afghanistan mandate for one year in February 2010 and increased the staff ceiling of 850 soldiers to 5,350.<sup>3</sup> In a government statement from Thursday, 22 April 2010, Chancellor Angela Merkel (Christian Democratic Union – CDU) defended the operation and called voices for an immediate withdrawal, as demanded by the Left Party (DIE LINKE), irresponsible. She also called for more support from society for the soldiers.<sup>4</sup>

The air strike in September 2009 on two tanker trucks in Afghanistan, ordered by Colonel Georg Klein, killed 142 people including many civilians and caused a preliminary proceedings from the Office of the Federal Prosecutor; moreover, it provoked international criticism of the Bundeswehr from the foreign ministers of Sweden and France, as well as from the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.<sup>5</sup> The preliminary proceedings have been stopped now and the Union parties – CDU and the Christian Social Union (CSU) – call for a swift end of the Kunduz-Inquiry.<sup>6</sup> The attack caused the resignation of Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Franz Josef Jung (CDU) in November 2009, who was Minister of Defence at the time of the incident. The reason behind this decision can be traced back to the wilful default of information by the Federal Ministry of Defence about civilian casualties, which had been kept secret despite Jung having knowledge of them.<sup>7</sup> In this regard, the present Minister of Defence zu Guttenberg (CSU) has changed his former position and has now declared that the air strike was “militarily inappropriate” after reviewing all documents.<sup>8</sup> To this day the question of guilt has not been fully answered.

With the elections to the Bundestag on 27 September 2009, the grand coalition ended and the new government of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats (FDP) began its work. The two parties formed a coalition government under Chancellor Angela Merkel, who regained power for the second time. The CDU won, together with its sister party CSU, 33.8 percent of votes, the Social Democrats (SPD), with 23 percent of votes, achieved their lowest result since the Second World War.<sup>9</sup> Crucial to the next elections to the Bundestag and the majority in the Bundesrat, the upper house of the German parliament, was the regional election in North Rhine-Westphalia on 9 May 2010. Already in August 2009, the last two governments exclusively formed by CDU in Thuringia and Saarland were voted out of power in German regional elections, endangering the majority held by CDU/CSU and FDP in the Bundesrat. After the electoral defeat of the ruling CDU-FDP coalition in North-Rhine Westfalia in May 2010 the governing parties have lost their majority in the Bundesrat. This has a significant effect on the national political landscape in Germany, because the government will need the support of the opposition parties for major policy changes, such as tax cuts and reforms in the public health sector.

---

<sup>1</sup> Tagesschau.de: Taliban-Angriff in Afghanistan: Bestürzung über Tod deutscher Soldaten, available at: <http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/afghanistan1740.html> (last access: 10 May 2010).

<sup>2</sup> Tagesschau.de: ARD-Umfrage. Rückhalt in der Bevölkerung für den Afghanistan-Einsatz schwindet, available at: <http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/afghanistanumfrage148.html> (last access: 10 May 2010).

<sup>3</sup> Bundesregierung: Neues Afghansitanmandat : Mehr Ausbildung und Schutz, available at: <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2010/02/2010-02-09-neues-afghanistanmandat.html> (last access: 10 May 2010).

<sup>4</sup> Faz.net: Merkels Regierungserklärung. Afghanistan-Mandat über jeden Zweifel erhaben, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/RubDDBDABB9457A437BAA85A49C26FB23A0/Doc-E9199C98DA0A14E92BA83531604718C96-ATpl-E-common-Scontent.html> (last access: 10 May 2010).

<sup>5</sup> Spiegel Online: The End of Innocence in Afghanistan. The German Air Strike Has Changed Everything, available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,648925,00.html> (last access: 10 May 2010).

---

<sup>6</sup> Faz.net: Union will Kundus-Ausschuss beenden. Luftangriff erschöpft erörtert?, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/Rub0CCA23BC3D3C4C78914F85BED3B53F3C/Doc~E023AFDF9452F40DB879D9D58847C662F~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html> (last access: 10 May 2010).

<sup>7</sup> Denkler, T.: Jung-Rücktritt. Zapfenstreich für den Problemminister, available at: <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/555/495877/text/> (last access: 10 May 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Faz.net: Luftschlag bei Kundus. Guttenberg: „Militärisch nicht angemessen“, available at: <http://www.faz.net/s/Rub0CCA23BC3D3C4C78914F85BED3B53F3C/Doc~EE8E18848093F488F85966D5BEF6DC8B7~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html> (last access: 10 May 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Das Endergebnis der Bundestagswahl 2009, available at: [http://www.bundestag.de/btq\\_wahl/wahlinfos/startseite/index.jsp](http://www.bundestag.de/btq_wahl/wahlinfos/startseite/index.jsp) (last access: 10 May 2010).

## Questionnaire for EU-27 Watch, No. 9

Reporting period December 2009 until May 2010 – Deadline for country reports 21 May

**All questions refer to the position/assessment of your country's government, opposition, political parties, civil society organisations, pressure groups, press/media, and public opinion. Please name sources wherever possible!**

### 1. Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty

On the 1 December 2009 the EU-reform ended with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. However, the new treaty provisions still have to be implemented. Some procedures and conditions have to be determined. In other cases, procedures, power relations, and decision-making mechanisms will change due to the new provisions.

- How is the work of the new President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, assessed in your country? Which changes to the role of the rotating council presidency are expected?
- How is the work of the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, assessed in your country? Please take into particular consideration both her role within the European Commission and her relationship to the Council of the European Union.
- On 25 March 2010 a "Proposal for a Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service" was presented. How is this concept perceived in your country? Which alternatives are discussed?
- On 31 March 2010 the European Commission presented a proposal defining the rules and procedures for the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI). What are the expectations for the ECI in your country? What are the various positions concerning the rules and procedures?

### 2. Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy

The European Commission has given its opinion on Iceland's application for EU-membership and a decision from the Council is expected before the end of June. Croatia seems to have settled its border dispute with Slovenia. Against this background:

- Which countries does your country expect to become members of the European Union in the next enlargement round? What are the opinions in your country on the membership of these countries?
- How are the membership perspectives of those countries discussed, which are not expected to become a member in the next enlargement round?

The Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean were the last major projects dealing with the European neighbourhood:

- How are these projects assessed in your country?

### 3. European economic policy and the financial and economic crisis

The European Council agreed on 25/26 March on the key elements of the Europe 2020 strategy, the successor of the Lisbon strategy. While not being on the formal agenda the economic and financial situation in Greece was discussed. The European Council agreed on a finance package combining bilateral loans from the eurozone and financing through the International Monetary Fund.

- How is the finance package for Greece assessed in your country? Are there any opinions on the process, how the agreement on the package was reached?
- Which lessons should be drawn from the Greek case for a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact?
- How is the idea of "a strong coordination of economic policies in Europe" perceived in your country? What concepts of an European economic governance are discussed in your country and which role do they assign to the Euro group?
- How is the Europe 2020 strategy discussed in your country? What are the priorities for the Europe 2020 strategy from your country's perspective?

### 4. Climate and energy policy

The climate conference in Copenhagen took note of the Copenhagen Accord but did not reach a binding agreement. The next conference of the parties (COP 16 & CMP 6) will take place at the end of November 2010.

- How is the Copenhagen conference assessed in your country? Please take into consideration the negotiation strategy of European Union and the results of the conference.
- Does the European Union need to change its own energy and climate policy in order to give a new impulse to the international negotiations?
- Is a global agreement within the UNFCCC the best strategy to fight climate change? If not, which alternative strategy should the European Union follow?
- What is your country's position on financing mitigation and adaptation efforts in developing countries?

### 5. Current issues and discourses in your country

Which other topics and discourses are highly salient in your country but not covered by this questionnaire?